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It’s a pleasure to work once again with the folks at Hudson Institute. Back in my New York days, I spent 
memorable days at the institute’s original headquarters 
on the banks of the Hudson River. Founder Herman Kahn 
would convene for marathon conversations an eclectic 
group of business leaders, journalists, academicians and 
military brass. Conversations with Herman tended to be 
highly autobiographical and on one of these occasions, 
Frank Cary, then the president of IBM and the only one 
of our number with the stature to do so, chided Herman 
for dominating the proceedings. Herman wheeled 
around—at almost three hundred pounds, he was the 
world’s largest physicist—and replied, “Frank, you 
don’t understand. Some people learn through the eye 
by reading, others through the ear by listening. I learn 
through the mouth by talking.”
Who knows, sometime during the course of these re-
marks I may become a wiser man myself.
You are all generally familiar with the Robertson v. Princeton lawsuit, the most important donor rights 
case since the Buck Trust case a generation ago. I will 
try to add some color and emphasis to accounts that 
have appeared in the press. I do so after stipulating that 
I am speaking only for myself and not for the Robertson 
family, nor—much as I’d like to—for Princeton Uni-
versity. 
The story begins forty-eight years ago this month 
when a young and charismatic President exhorted his 
fellow Americans to bear any burden, pay any price in 
the cause of freedom. Two of those fellow Americans, 
Charles and Marie Robertson, patriots both, answered 
the call. With offi cials at Charles’ alma mater, Princeton 
University, they devised a program to develop young 
Americans for government service in the international 
arena—foreign service offi cers, trade and development 
offi cials, intelligence analysts and such like. In 1961, to 
launch and sustain the program, the Robertsons made 
a contribution of $35 million. Inside the Beltway, that 
may sound like loose change spilled from a bailout bill. 
But it was at the time the largest contribution ever made 
to the university. It is thus useful to remember as this 
story unfolds that the Robertsons are one of Princeton’s 
most generous donor families. It should also be noted 
that the Robertsons were private people who were 
assured by Princeton that their contribution would 
remain anonymous. 
The new program, housed on campus at the Woodrow 
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, got 
off to a promising start—so promising in fact that the 
rumor began to spread, and then take root, that the lav-
ishly funded program was in actuality a CIA front. 
Fearing damage to its academic reputation, Princeton 
then asked the Robertsons for a second contribution—
this time, the gift of their privacy. The Robertsons con-
sented, their patronage was publicly acknowledged 
and Robertson Hall, designed by the eminent architect 
Minoru Yamasaki, became the visible symbol of the 
school.    
Over the decades that followed, the Wilson School 
grew in reputation and infl uence, becoming both an 
ornament to the university and a resource for the 
nation. The initial Robertson gift of $35 million grew 
just as impressively. After giving away hundreds of 
millions to support the Wilson School, the Robertson 
Foundation—the supporting organization set up to 
administer the family contribution—had amassed 
assets of approximately $930 million by late 2007. This 
stellar investment performance, in perfect symbiosis, 
fueled the ongoing academic excellence. The Robertson 
Foundation—directed by a board comprising four 
university appointees and three family members—was 
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regarded as an unqualifi ed success; indeed, as a model of 
collaboration between a donor family and an academic 
institution.
Over time, of course, the founding generation gave way to successors. On the family side, Charles and 
Marie passed on and were succeeded in family lead-
ership by their four children and a cousin. Leadership 
turned over periodically at Princeton, too, bringing in 
people who had not been present at the creation of the 
foundation and seemed to the family to be less collegial 
and, ultimately, less committed to the founding vision. 
As the years passed, squabbles over procedural issues 
began to harden into principled disagreements. In the 
view of the second-generation Robertsons, the founda-
tion was falling victim to mission creep. They became 
particularly concerned that the Wilson School was no 
longer turning out enough fi rst-tier candidates for the 
foreign service. In one cohort of 66 Wilson students, 
for example, only three had entered the foreign service. 
More from that same cohort had gone into management 
consulting, more into investment banking, more into 
exotic quarters of the fi nancial services industry. While 
those professions may have been warmly esteemed in 
the offi ces of the Princeton Alumni Fund, they were 
taken as warning signals by the Robertson family. The 
Wilson School seemed to be morphing into some hy-
brid form of business school. As the data crystallized 
year to year, the Robertsons came to believe that mis-
sion creep had turned into mission defl ected, if not mis-
sion aborted. Princeton seemed committed to a course 
that their parents had not intended and would not have 
supported.
After years of disagreement and contentious meetings, 
the family fi led suit in July 2002. In their complaint, the 
plaintiffs sought what their lawyers referred to as the 
“death penalty”—the transfer of the foundation’s funds 
to other universities willing to carry out the Robertson 
mission. It is accurate to say that the lawsuit was fi led 
and then pursued more in sorrow than in anger. Both 
of Charles and Marie’s sons were themselves devoted 
Princeton alumni. 
The university responded to the suit with a fl urry of 
press attacks on the Robertsons—which I will not re-
hearse here—and launched a war of attrition designed 
to divide the family and exhaust its resources. And so 
the battle was joined . . .
Let me offer some observations on the winding course of this case that led to the settlement announced 
last month.
First, as Herman Kahn might have put it, a word about 
the correlation of forces. On the Robertson side, we had 
three fi rst-class law fi rms—trial counsel in California, 
local counsel in New Jersey, settlement counsel in New 
York. We had two publicity offi ces. We had more than 
a dozen expert witnesses, each a brand-name specialist 
in some obscure corner of the nonprofi t world. 
And we had a cadre of donors and would-be donors 
around the country that followed the case closely and 
provided sympathetic counsel. My own role fell under 
the category of litigation support, in which capacity I 
helped to give shape and direction to the case, while 
maintaining such coherence as we could between our 
twin campaigns, the one in the court of law and the 
other in the court of public opinion. (Yes, the great 
Irving Kristol was correct when he observed that the 
problem with contemporary society is that nobody 
can tell you what they do for a living in twenty-fi ve 
words or less.) I had never been engaged in high-stakes 
litigation before, but I regarded our team as formidable, 
and likely to be irresistibly so. We had good people and 
plenty of them. That opinion was formed, alas, before 
the massed legions of Princeton University lumbered 
onto the fi eld. In the confl ict that followed, we might 
as well have been cast as the Tibetans, with Princeton 
as the Chinese army. What we discovered over the 
next six and one-half years is that if you walk down 
any corridor of New Jersey power—be it business, 
labor, law, media, fi nance, philanthropy or academia—
you are likely to fi nd ensconced in the corner offi ce a 
chauvinistic Princetonian. You are virtually certain to 
fi nd a person who hopes to send his or her children or 
grandchildren to Princeton. I have encountered such 
intensity of institutional allegiance only twice before. 
First at the US Military Academy. During my White 
House Fellows days, I was surprised to fi nd that Army 
offi cers, by then well established in their careers, still 
measured each other by how they had performed in 
classroom and PT contests waged fi fteen years earlier 
at West Point. Indeed, we know from their writings that 
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even Eisenhower and MacArthur, well into late middle 
age, continued to eye each other through the prism of 
their performance as cadets. The other example is Yale. 
I returned to New Haven as a journalist in 2004, curious 
to learn why almost all of the stars of that political 
season had sprung from the same small college – George 
Bush, John Kerry, Howard Dean, Dick Cheney, Joe 
Lieberman. What I found at Yale was that curiosity ran 
elsewhere . . . to the question of how John Edwards had 
somehow managed to infi ltrate their ranks. The point 
here is that Princeton was the home team and we were 
the visiting squad. Home court advantage was a factor 
from beginning to end, a reality that was punctuated by 
the home-town press coverage of the settlement itself. 
Readers of those stories could be forgiven for thinking 
that all of the issues had somehow been compromised 
away and that there had been no clear winner in the 
case.
Let me make a second point about the legal process. 
Watching big-time litigation up close should require 
parental consent. The process is nasty, brutish and long. 
Of the various motions fi led by Princeton, none of them 
sought to sharpen the issue or resolve the case, all of 
them had the effect of delaying the proceedings, and 
not a few of them should have been memorialized on 
plaques in the Museum of Legal Nonsense. I am not 
a lawyer and I am thus not closely informed about 
the term “legal abuse,” but to my untrained eye there 
was massive abuse of the system in this case. In her 
statement on the settlement last month, the President 
of Princeton opined that it was “tragic” that Princeton 
had been obliged to spend almost $40 million on legal 
fees—money that could have been better spent on edu-
cation. I would observe, with due respect, that it was at 
the very core of Princeton’s strategy to run up the le-
gal bills and starve out the Robertsons. The Robertsons 
were ready—indeed, eager—for trial by 2004.
One result of a war of attrition is . . . attrition. On the 
family side, one of the original plaintiffs died. Mem-
bers of the third generation grew to maturity and sought 
a voice in family councils. The original trial judge re-
tired. His successor, swamped with administrative 
work, had to withdraw from the case. Her successor, 
a third judge, was called out of retirement to preside 
at trial. On the Princeton side, it should be conceded, 
there were signs of subtle improvement over the years, 
as the Wilson School seemed to tack back toward the 
original Robertson mission. I leave it others to deter-
mine whether this late vocation was a matter of con-
viction or of case-related optics. Princeton even began 
a publicity campaign highlighting the contributions to 
public service made by its illustrious graduates. The re-
sults were mixed. One day I opened a document to fi nd 
a glowing endorsement of the Wilson School from its 
distinguished alumnus, Eliot Spitzer. Shortly thereafter 
came the news that the Governor had been conducting 
interstate commerce at the Mayfl ower Hotel. He was 
quickly replaced in the campaign by equally devoted 
Wilson alumnus, Anthony Lake, about whom we have 
heard nothing but good things. And on the investment 
side, performance turned dramatically, from what had 
been notably good to what became alarmingly bad. 
Over the past year, the Foundation fund, as a conse-
quence of Princeton’s huge bet on so-called alternative 
investments, has plunged precipitously. In its ill-fated 
attempt to out-Yale Yale in investment performance, 
Princeton had loaded up on private equity, hedge funds 
and other illiquid assets. My guesstimate is that at the 
time of the settlement the fund had declined to $585 
million. (I should note that Princeton has disputed this 
fi gure, while declining to release supporting data.) 
Let me comment, fi nally, on the settlement and what it means for the world of philanthropy. Just to re-
mind you of the facts: Princeton paid $100 million to 
settle the Robertson lawsuit, the largest “donor intent” 
award in history. 
One of the most heuristic documents produced during 
the discovery process was an audit of foundation 
spending. One of the Big Four accounting fi rms, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, had been commissioned by 
the family to conduct a forensic audit of Robertson 
Foundation accounts. What PWC found was that 
large chunks of overhead had been misallocated, that 
professors and other personnel had been improperly 
billed to the foundation, that the construction of a building 
unrelated to the Robertson program—a building!—had 
been charged to the foundation. In total, according to 
PWC, more than $100 million of foundation funds had 
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been misused by university offi cials. 
Now, as it happened, the trial structure prescribed by 
the court would have begun with a presentation by the 
plaintiffs of the basic PWC fi ndings. Day after day, a 
chronicle of Princeton’s alleged misdeeds would have 
unfolded in the media capital of the world. Even at this 
distance, one can almost hear the taunts of the tabloids, 
the clucking of The New York Times. In my view—re-
gardless of the verdict in the trial—Princeton’s reputa-
tion would not have been stained; it would have been 
irreparably damaged. For Princeton to settle was a thor-
oughly rational decision. 
The family had its own calculus of concerns. You’ve 
all heard the wisecrack, “If somebody says, ‘it’s not the 
money, it’s the principle of the thing,’ you can bet it’s 
the money.” For the Robertson family it was, clearly, 
about the money and the principle. They wanted the 
money to carry out the original intentions of their par-
ents to develop young talent for the foreign service and 
especially now, when a young and charismatic President 
has called on his fellow Americans to regenerate the 
soft power of diplomacy. The Robertsons also sought 
to uphold the lapidary principle that when a contribu-
tion is made for Purpose A, it cannot and should not be 
diverted to Purpose B. They sought to uphold that prin-
ciple not only for their own family, but for donors and 
grantees everywhere. They succeeded. For donors, this 
case has brought a heartening example; for grantees, a 
sobering effect.
There were absolutists on both sides of the case—those 
who sought, on the one hand, a Mosaic reaffi rmation 
of the Eighth Commandment or, on the other, a clarion 
declaration that donor rights should expire the moment 
the check clears. The absolutists were destined for dis-
appointment at trial. In all likelihood, the verdict would 
have turned on an esoteric legal point, a conclusion fas-
cinating to a few dozen lawyers and frustrating to a few 
million laymen. I sense no buyer’s remorse on either 
side. The Robertsons reclaimed funds suffi cient to the 
family task and secured at least for this generation the 
principle of donor rights. Princeton, for its part, was 
publicly embarrassed and fi nancially penalized, but it 
managed to avoid the death penalty. Even before the 
legal contest was resolved, Princeton set up a new Of-
fi ce of Stewardship, whose responsibility it is to con-
form campus spending with donor intention. At this 
moment in time, the safest place on the planet for donor 
intent may well be Princeton, New Jersey.
At the risk of grandiosity, let me conclude by stating 
what I think this case means. At the heart of every char-
itable contribution is the concept of trust—trust by the 
donor that the grantee will do what he has agreed to do. 
If that trust is allowed to erode, if the donor can no lon-
ger rely on the grantee’s assurance, then charitable con-
tributions will decline and the civil society they sustain 
will decline along with them. If that were to happen—if 
the private, voluntary, civil society that Tocqueville 
fi rst acclaimed, and that the Bradley Center still cel-
ebrates, were to wither away—America would abandon 
one of its defi ning national traits. Absent a vibrant civil 
society, only government would be left to fi ll the social 
vacuum and the America of tomorrow would come to 
look very much like the Europe of today.
As you work your way through your list of New Year’s 
resolutions, please remember to thank the Robertson 
family. They have rendered a public service in the high-
est traditions of the Woodrow Wilson School.
Neal B. Freeman is chairman of the Foundation Management Institute.  He can be reached by e-mail at
 nealfreeman@foundmgmt.com. 
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Comments and 
Freeman’s Responses
Pablo Eisenberg: The Robertson Case Was A 
Waste of Time, Energy and Money
The lawsuit brought by the Robertson family against Princeton University for allegedly violating donor 
intent has been a waste of money, time and effort. Its 
resolution should bring a sigh of relief to all parties 
concerned, especially the Woodrow Wilson School for 
which this affair was a major distraction.
The out-of-court settlement is being touted by some 
conservatives as a victory for “donor intent,” since the 
second generation Robertsons claimed that the money 
from the Robertson Foundation had not been used to 
graduate suffi cient numbers of students for work in 
public foreign service organizations. These advocates 
should be reminded that the donors were Charles 
and Marie Robertson, not their children who sued 
Princeton.
 All the evidence points to the fact that Charles and 
Marie were satisfi ed with the Woodrow Wilson 
School’s work and record. Until their death, they did 
not complain about the use of their money. As board 
members of the Robertson Foundation, composed 
of three family members and four representatives of 
Princeton, they approved, along with other family 
trustees, the “Bowen formula” for fi nancing the school 
for over forty years. Not until recently did their children 
object to the original agreement between the university 
and the Robertsons. Donor intent should be measured 
by the views and attitudes of the original donors, not 
those of their progeny. By that measure, donor intent 
clearly has been maintained by the university.
The original foundation’s Certifi cate of Incorporation 
states that the school will be a place where students 
can prepare themselves for a career in public service, 
with a special emphasis on areas of the federal 
government concerned with international relations. It 
does not say that the school would only be a training 
ground for career foreign service offi cers, a point the 
younger Robertsons seemed to stress in their law suit. 
The younger Robertsons appear to have been piqued 
both by a narrower view of the school’s purpose and 
the board’s decision to hire a professional investment 
fi rm to manage the foundation’s investments, a change 
which greatly enhanced the foundation’s assets.
Advocates for the Robertsons stress how few graduates 
of the school seem to have entered the foreign service. 
One has to note that with the advent of the Reagan 
administration the appeal of government service for 
young people lost much of its allure. Over the past 25 
years government service has been vilifi ed by politi-
cians, mostly conservative, and many of our brightest, 
but disillusioned, civil servants left to go elsewhere. 
Budget cuts, the downsizing of our diplomatic corps 
and the elimination of the US Information Agency also 
resulted in fewer opportunities for graduates interested 
in foreign service. No wonder there was not a massive 
demand for a foreign or government service career, but 
that was not the school’s fault.
Yet despite these obstacles the employment statistics of 
graduates are impressive. Between 1973 and 2006, 72.5 
percent of graduates chose to work in public or non-
profi t sector, including 41.5 percent who went to work 
in government service. In 2006, 88 percent of graduates 
chose employment in the public or nonprofi t sector, 59 
percent of whom entered government service. That is an 
impressive track record, laying bare the fatuous claims 
of the younger Robertsons.
Over the past 45 years, the university may well have 
improperly used a little of the Robertson money or 
made some accounting errors, but on the whole it has 
run an outstanding program which made the original 
donors proud and would still make them proud today. 
The children have made a philanthropic mountain out 
of a molehill.
Freeman’s Response to Eisenberg
I agree that, for Mr. Eisenberg and his fellow Prince-tonians, this case was a waste of time. The expert 
witness on this point is Richard Levin of Yale. Dr. 
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Levin has just completed a remarkable 15-year run as 
president, during which time he overhauled the physical 
plant, fi lled in the blanks in a world-class faculty, 
improved the student experience by every measure—
even as he grew the Yale endowment faster than any of 
its peers. Just as one index of the esteem in which he is 
held:  Levin’s subordinates in the Yale administration 
have been recruited for top jobs at Oxford, Cambridge, 
Pennsylvania, and Duke. In an anniversary interview 
celebrating Levin’s many achievements, this exchange 
occurs:
Q: If you were to pick something of which you’d say, 
“I could have done this better,” what would that be?
Levin: The Bass gift [of $20 million for the study of 
Western civilization, which Yale returned in 1995] re-
mains the best example. I should have moved quickly 
to implement the program Mr. Bass intended. Because 
the issue was complicated, I didn’t deal with it imme-
diately. It was a good lesson. Subsequently, when there 
has been a sign of trouble, I have been much more vigi-
lant.
Exactly. Princeton should have settled the Robertson 
case in 2002. Better still, Princeton should have been 
suffi ciently vigilant to deal with the Robertsons’ con-
cerns immediately, long before the family felt com-
pelled to fi le suit.
As for the Robertsons, the case was not a waste of time. 
Indeed, it’s diffi cult to imagine how they could have 
spent their time more productively. They reclaimed 
their parents’ legacy; they struck a reverberating blow 
for donors’ rights; and they won $100 million to carry 
out their philanthropic mission. General opinion has re-
garded this result as a win-win-win, made all the more 
unambiguous by Princeton’s implicit admission of cul-
pability. (There may be certain philanthropic situations 
that only nonprofi t experts are fully equipped to misun-
derstand.)
I have admired Mr. Eisenberg’s trenchant commentary 
over the years and thus I can’t help but notice when he’s 
off his game. This statement, for instance: “The out-of-
court settlement is being touted by some conservatives as 
a victory for ‘donor intent.’” Notice, fi rst, the quotation 
marks, which signal the reader that he or she is about to 
encounter a preposterous notion, much in the way one 
comes across a reference to “fl ying saucers.” Notice, 
second, that the only people who seem to be falling for 
this preposterous notion are some conservatives, by 
which phrase I think Mr. Eisenberg intends to summon 
not the ghost of Edmund Burke but a visage of low 
intelligence and mean spirit. Well, take a hypothetical 
example. Suppose that Mr. Jones offers a contribution 
to Mr. Smith to build a biology lab. Suppose further 
that Mr. Smith then takes the check and builds a hockey 
rink instead. Is this an ideological act? If so, by whom, 
and to what ideological end? Or is it an old-fashioned 
wrongful act? Is Mr. Smith saying in so many legalistic 
words: “You can forget all that talk about the bio lab. 
We now control the money and we’re going to build a 
hockey rink.”  And if that is what Mr. Smith is saying, 
is that an approach that some liberals would embrace? 
Or is Mr. Smith of the mindset that would use quotation 
marks as tongs, holding at arm’s length a principle so 
fundamental to the philanthropic transaction as donor 
intent?
Quite apart from the problem of donor intention torn or 
twisted is the problem of misused funds—money spent 
on projects unrelated to even an elaborately evolved 
sense of mission. Mr. Eisenberg’s insouciant shrug re-
fl ects a position that, to my knowledge, no fi duciary has 
dared to take. In public, I mean.
Peter Frumkin
Standing at the end of a long line of cases before it, the Robertson case is yet one more instance in 
which well-meaning donors have had their intent modi-
fi ed—and at times fully thwarted—by equally well-
meaning recipients. While Princeton did enlarge the 
purpose of the original gift, few could argue that the 
Woodrow Wilson School has not contributed to the 
public good by preparing leaders for all forms of public 
service. I think the compromise worked in the case ac-
tually represents a fair resolution of the matter at hand. 
It would be unreasonable to demand the entire gift be 
returned and it would also be unfair not to give the fam-
ily a chance to redirect some of their gift toward its pre-
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cise original purpose. 
In trying to fashion solutions to challenges from donors, 
the courts face a diffi cult problem. Often it is very hard 
to determine when a charitable intent has become im-
possible or impractical to implement. Equally diffi cult 
is the task of even deciding what constitutes a legiti-
mate interpretation of the purposes of a charitable gift. 
While the past several decades have seen many other 
cases like Robertson and while trust lawyers have tried 
to fi nd ways of crafting ever more airtight expressions 
of charitable intent, problems like the one encountered 
by the Robertsons are likely to continue to arise. Why? 
Two reasons: Death leaves the one person who really 
knew what was intended out of the process. Second, 
the passing of time inevitably changes the conditions 
on the ground. Donors who are very concerned about 
preserving their intent in perpetuity should recall Carn-
egie’s dictum that “to die rich is to die disgraced.” They 
should simply avoid endowment gifts altogether and 
make instead  operating grants while they are alive. In 
the end, this is the only sure solution to the problem of 
donor intent.
Freeman’s Response to Frumkin
Mr. Frumkin’s comments are both irenic and solo-monic. My only suggestion would be that, in his 
next life, he become a judge, preferably in New Jersey. 
Heather Higgins
Thanks to Neal Freeman for marvelous commentary on Robertson v. Princeton, and to the Robertsons 
themselves for having the fortitude and principle to see 
this through. Such examples will be particularly impor-
tant as we confront those who think donor intent is a 
smoke screen—the Wall Street Journal in a December 
24, 2008 editorial reported that Congressman Becerra 
“told us the whole idea of donor intent is a ‘convenient 
excuse’ used by philanthropists, like saying ‘the devil 
made me do it’”—and those who believe tax-exempt 
funds are really public money in private trust. One fears 
that the short-sighted temptation of getting at all those 
golden eggs will once again lead to the practical evis-
ceration of the producing goose.
One other practical point: Donors are increasingly 
aware that many universities view donors as a nec-
essary evil to be borne patiently till the funds are re-
ceived, and then ignored. But on a personal basis, the 
sucking up is often suffi ciently convincing to persuade 
donors that that it is their good fortune to be the excep-
tion. Even if that’s miraculously true, remember that 
people make policy and interpret intent; whoever it is 
that you have the good relationship with will someday 
be replaced with someone else. The Robertson case is a 
cautionary tale about the perils of creating gifts that go 
on in perpetuity rather than having limited lives and the 
opportunity to renew . . . or not.
Freeman’s Response to Higgins
Ms. Higgins makes the point better than I did (an annoying habit of hers). There are no lasting 
solutions to the problem of human weakness and the 
Robertsons do not claim to have devised one. Eternal 
vigilance, as someone once put it in a different connec-
tion, is the condign response.  
Adam Meyerson
There are three important numbers to remember in the Princeton-Robertson settlement.
14 percent is the proportion of Masters in Public Affairs 
alumni of the Woodrow Wilson School between 1973 
and 2006 who took jobs upon graduation who went 
to work for the federal government in international 
affairs. (Another 11 percent went to work for the federal 
government overall, and another 17 percent for state, 
local, and foreign governments.) The explicit purpose of 
Charles and Marie Robertson’s gift to Princeton in 1961, 
then the largest contribution in the university’s history, 
was to create a graduate school to prepare students 
“for careers in government service (particularly federal 
government service in areas concerned with international 
relations and affairs).” The Wilson School’s graduate 
program is an outstanding academic institution, and its 
distinguished alumni include the likes of General David 
Petraeus and President Clinton’s National Security 
Adviser Anthony Lake. But if Princeton had focused 
more of the Robertsons’ gift on its primary purpose, 
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as the university began to do during the course of the 
litigation, their heirs would never have launched this 
costly lawsuit.
$100 million is the approximate total that Princeton will 
pay to settle the lawsuit—$40 million to reimburse the 
plaintiffs’ family foundation for the costs of litigation, 
and $50 million plus interest to establish a new founda-
tion to achieve the donors’ original purpose. This aston-
ishingly high sum is a signifi cant partial victory for the 
Robertsons and for the cause of donor intent. Princeton 
can also declare partial victory. The university will now 
legally enjoy unrestricted access to most of the Robert-
son funds—currently totaling about $700 million—to 
spend as it wishes. But the magnitude of the settlement 
is a recognition that there was suffi cient merit in the 
Robertsons’ charges to bring the case to trial. As a re-
sult, universities and other grantees in the future will 
pay more attention to understanding, clarifying, and at 
least initially adhering to the intentions of their donors. 
$40 million was the cost of the litigation for the Rob-
ertsons. Donors throughout America owe a great debt 
of gratitude to the Robertson family. They fought like 
tigers to honor Charles and Marie’s philanthropic in-
tentions, and to publicize the violations of donor intent 
that sometimes occur in university giving. But the enor-
mous cost of such litigation will be prohibitively high 
for most donor families, and suggests that lawsuits will 
be used only as a rare recourse in confl icts over donor 
intent, at least in cases with deep-pocket defendants 
such as Princeton.
For donors, the Robertson case is a reminder of three 
lessons.
Be wary of gifts in perpetuity. Endowment giving for 
universities and other institutions should be approached 
with great caution. In particular, donors should be aware 
that grantee organizations can dramatically change their 
world views in future generations.
Consider intermediaries. Donors who do want to leave 
endowment-like legacies may want to give to interme-
diary institutions that can disburse funds according to 
whether the ultimate grantee is fulfi lling the purposes of 
the gift. The supporting organization structure that was 
used by the Robertson Foundation (the board included 
family members but was controlled by Princeton) is not 
necessarily an effective protection for carrying out phil-
anthropic intent after the donors’ death.
Write it down. One reason the Robertson family was 
able to proceed as far as it did with its case against 
Princeton is that Charles and Marie Robertson wrote 
down clearly the purposes of the graduate school they 
established.
Freeman’s Response to Meyerson
Mr. Meyerson has the basics of the story right, but some of his numbers are drawn from press releas-
es and are thus colored by advocacy. The only number 
that has to be accosted here is the $700 million “cur-
rently” in the Robertson fund. If only. As late reports 
drift in from dark precincts of the private equity world, 
it may well be that my estimate of $585 million is off to 
the high side by a substantial margin. Either way, we’ll 
fi nd out in a few months at the end of the fi scal year. 
More substantively, I would concur with Mr. Meyerson’s 
three cautionary and characteristically sensible 
lessons, to which I would add a fourth. In some donor 
circumstances, the best option of all is to include a sunset 
provision, whereby the foundation goes out of business 
at a time certain or, more commonly, a circumstance 
certain. Foundation executives, not to mention their 
accountants and lawyers, can be understandably 
slow to appreciate the merits of such a provision, but 
sunsetting can be the apposite answer for some family 
philanthropies.
And a word about those Princeton PR people. They 
were nothing if not stakhanovite, but their bump and 
hustle sometimes overtook plausibility. A case in point. 
When asked to explain why they had settled the case, 
Princeton stated that, while they were confi dent they 
would prevail at trial, it would cost at least $10 million 
to try the case. Let’s see. Princeton paid the Robertsons 
$100 milion rather than pay $10 million in legal fees to 
kick their butt in court? I don’t think so.  
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Anne D. Neal: Lessons for Alumni and Trustees
When discussing national security matters, Presi-dent Ronald Reagan was fond of saying “trust 
but verify.” Thanks to the Robertsons, alumni and trust-
ees should now think the same way. In the past, most 
alumni believed they could give no-strings attached do-
nations to their alma maters, trusting, as Neal Freeman 
says, “that the grantee will do what he has agreed to 
do.” The Robertson case at Princeton, like the earlier 
controversy over the Bass gift at Yale, has shown us 
that universities have broken that compact of trust. As 
a result, it is now imperative for devoted alumni and 
trustees to take an active role in ensuring their alma 
maters live up to the high standards of excellence and 
integrity expected of them.  
When giving to a university, donors must apply the 
same kind of diligence and vigilance they would when 
making any other comparable investment.  Donors have 
a responsibility to make sure that they give wisely—
which means, fi nding a faculty friend, targeting their 
gift to a program close to their heart, clearly stipulat-
ing their instructions in writing and following up to en-
sure that the donation is properly implemented. Since 
the special protocols of higher education make giving 
particularly challenging, donors are frequently unaware 
of which questions to ask, much less of what consti-
tutes an acceptable answer. To help clarify matters, the 
American Council of Trustees and Alumni created its 
Fund for Academic Renewal and published The Intel-
ligent Donor’s Guide to College Giving.
Donor vigilance, of course, in no way detracts from the 
university’s own responsibility to carry out the donor’s 
intent. The fact is, alumni give more than $8 billion a 
year to their universities—a massive source of fi nan-
cial support for higher education. Boards would be 
well advised to take steps to affi rm their commitment 
to following donor intent, especially in these straitened 
times. They could, for starters, create a stewardship 
committee responsible for the review and monitoring 
of large targeted gifts, and also explore other ways to 
address donor concerns. 
The Robertsons have shown us that thoughtful, targeted 
gifts benefi t universities as they call them to fulfi ll their 
highest ideals. For that, alumni, trustees and all those 
concerned about higher education should be thankful.
Freeman’s Response to Neal
I am grateful to Ms. Neal for reminding us of the singu-lar contribution of the Robertson family to the cause 
of responsible grantmaking. There has been much mut-
tering over the years on the subject of donor intent—
muttering about commitments bent and broken, mutter-
ing about deals that turned out not to be deals—but real 
progress could be achieved only when somebody drew 
a line in the sand and said, “This far and no further.” 
That’s what the Robertsons did, at considerable risk to 
their otherwise comfortable lives, their fortunes, and (at 
least when the PR machines were cranked up full blast) 
their reputations. They gave new life to the tired con-
cept of donor intent. We hope that Ms. Neal and others 
in a position to do so will consolidate the Robertson 
victory and build productive, respectful relationships 
between donors and grantees.
James Piereson
Judging by the post-settlement commentary, Princ-eton University and the Robertson family remain as 
much at odds now over the meaning of their agreement 
as they were during the course of their contentious liti-
gation. Neal Freeman, in his lucid summary of the case, 
describes how over the course of many decades the uni-
versity ignored the terms of its initial agreement with 
the Robertson family and then during the course of the 
lawsuit stonewalled and stretched out the litigation as a 
strategy to bleed the family with mounting legal costs. 
In the end, as Mr. Freeman says, the university even-
tually gave in for fear of embarrassing material about 
its dealings with donors that would be brought out at 
trial (some of which had already been published a few 
years ago in The Wall Street Journal). The settlement 
decreed that the university would pick up some $40 
million in legal costs incurred by the Robertson family 
in the course of the litigation and fund a new foundation 
controlled by the family to train students for work in 
government service. Mr. Freeman judges the settlement 
to have been a victory for the principle of donor intent. 
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Princeton University, however, continutes to take an 
entirely different view of the matter.  In a letter to The 
Chronicle of Philanthropy (January 29, opposite page), 
Robert K. Durkee, vice president and secretary of the 
university, declares that Princeton was the aggrieved 
party and that it was the descendants of the Robertsons 
who, in fact, broke with the intentions of their parents. 
“It was the Robertsons, not Princeton,” he writes, “who 
were trying to overturn the donor’s intent.” In his view, 
due to a sophisticated public relations campaign mount-
ed by the plaintiffs,  the press mistakenly “bought into” 
the Robertsons’ view that the university had violated 
the terms of the original 1961 agreement. Mr. Durkee 
seems especially bitter about the fact that the Robertsons 
were able to draw upon the resources of another family 
foundation, the Banbury Fund, to cover costs of litiga-
tion (thereby frustrating the university in its tactic of 
bleeding the family through legal expenses). He thinks, 
in retrospect, that it was a mistake for the university 
to have created a supporting organization to administer 
the grant which eventually provided an opening to the 
family to challenge the university’s administration of 
the funds.  It would have been better for the university 
simply to have accepted the gift with restrictions so that 
no one later would have had standing to challenge its 
control of the funds. 
It is hard to accept Mr. Durkee’s version of the case in 
view of the material that has already been made pub-
lic showing that university offi cials going back several 
decades chose to ignore the terms of the gift and delib-
erately spent funds on purposes unrelated to the train-
ing of students for government service. As that purpose, 
originally inspired by President Kennedy, lost its caché 
among academics from the late 1960s onward, the uni-
versity began to divert Robertson funds to other aca-
demic purposes more in keeping with the trends of the 
time. It is perfectly understandable why the university 
did not want this material opened up for public discus-
sion, in view of the effects it might have had on current 
and future donors to the institution.  On the other hand, 
the academics and administrators at Princeton Univer-
sity no doubt feel that they must adapt their academic 
programs to changing times and circumstances and that 
such programs cannot be bound and limited by agree-
ments made with donors a half century ago.
Such loud disagreements between the parties are rather 
unusual in the wake of such legal settlements because 
they usually wish to “move on” and place behind them 
the unpleasant accusations and allegations that are typi-
cally exchanged during the course of an expensive law-
suit. They are a measure of the continuing acrimony 
between the family and the university that must have 
been built up not only during the course of the litigation 
but over the many years that preceded it.  
What lessons, however, should “innocent bystanders” 
take from this important case?
From the standpoint of donors, the case itself, along 
with Mr. Durkee’s commentary on it, points to the dan-
gers of awarding endowment gifts to colleges and uni-
versities in order to achieve some well defi ned purpose. 
It is very diffi cult over a long period of time to hold 
an institution to any such purpose. The administrators 
who negotiated the agreement pass on and are replaced 
by deans and professors with no personal knowledge 
and little concern for it. The principals (generally of ad-
vanced age) who awarded the gift soon pass on.  The 
money eventually begins to slosh about in a growing 
endowment to be deployed to any number of needs of 
the moment. The purpose itself may lose its urgency 
and importance in the academic setting or even in the 
wider world. Many colleges and universities today ad-
minister endowments awarded years ago to study the 
Soviet Union. Perpetual endowments, contrary to Mr. 
Durkee, are not the best means for donors of achieving 
such purposes.
It might have been better for the Robertson to have 
made a pledge to Princeton University for a period of 
years to underwrite their stated purposes.  A portion of 
the funds might have been paid out at the beginning of 
the project, with additional funds released later on the 
basis of performance. The term of the gift could have 
been extended out to as long as fi fteen or twenty years 
and either folded up at that time or extended for another 
period. It is diffi cult for anyone to look into the future 
beyond such a time frame and thus unwise to project 
any well-defi ned purpose much further out on to the 
horizon. Many donors, in fact, prefer to make such gifts 
for far shorter periods of time—three or fi ve years be-
ing the preferred standard, with extensions based upon 
reviews and performance. Donors have need of such a 
practice in order to counter the position suggested by 
Mr. Durkee—that once the money is in the university’s 
hands, it alone is the fi nal arbiter as to its use.
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To the Editor:
The settlement of the six-and-a-half-year-old lawsuit brought against Princeton University by members of the Robertson 
family (The Chronicle, January 15) has attracted plenty of good 
advice for nonprofi t groups: Be clear about the purpose of a gift, 
have clear guidelines for its use, stay in touch with the donors, 
and involve their children.
But one lesson of the lawsuit is that a university can do all these 
things—as Princeton did—and still end up in court. In 1961 
Princeton and representatives of the Robertson family signed a 
written document that spelled out the purpose to be served by 
Marie Robertson’s $35-million gift and the means by which the 
gift would be administered. For 47 years Princeton has fully 
adhered to the terms of that document, creating at its Wood-
row Wilson School of Public and International Affairs one of 
the world’s leading graduate programs to prepare students for 
government and public service.
For 20 years, until his death in 1981, Marie’s husband, Charles 
Robertson, chaired the Robertson Foundation board that 
oversaw the use of the gift. His son William Robertson began 
serving on that board in 1974, shortly after his graduation 
from Princeton, attended every meeting, frequently praised the 
university’s use of the gift, and never cast a dissenting vote as a 
board member until he fi led his lawsuit in 2002.
Despite all this, William Robertson went to court in an attempt 
to overturn two key decisions his parents had made: that the gift 
should be controlled by Princeton and that it should be used 
to support and expand the graduate program of the Woodrow 
Wilson School. He did this initially because of a dispute over en-
gaging professional management for an endowment that by then 
exceeded $500-million. As time went on and the endowment in-
creased to more than $900-million under the professional man-
agers who were selected, he downplayed this issue and instead 
challenged Princeton’s right to make decisions about how best 
to support its graduate program.
One of the great ironies of this lawsuit is that the press bought 
into the family’s assertion that the case was about Princeton’s 
adherence to “donor intent.” While it may have been about 
whether Princeton properly carried out the terms of the cer-
tifi cate of incorporation that created the Robertson Foundation, 
and we have no doubt a trial would have convincingly demon-
strated that Princeton did, the question of “intent” raised by 
this trial was precisely the reverse: whether the descendants of 
a donor can overturn the donor’s intent—as expressed in a care-
fully negotiated written document agreed to by the donor and 
the university—with respect to both the purpose of the gift and 
the mechanism by which it would be administered. 
It was the Robertsons, not Princeton, who were trying to over-
turn the donor’s intent.
There is another issue of “donor intent” raised by this case, and 
it also involves actions taken by the Robertsons. In the 1940s 
Charles Robertson established a family foundation, the Banbury 
Fund, to support charitable purposes. In their lawsuit against 
Princeton, the Robertson family members who controlled that 
foundation drew upon its assets not to support charitable pur-
poses, but to pay for their legal and public-relations expenses. 
Over the course of the lawsuit, their expenses exceeded $40-
million, and the assets of the Banbury Fund dropped from ap-
proximately $50-million when the lawsuit began to under $10-
million.
So if the fi rst lesson of this lawsuit is that conscientious adher-
ence to the terms of a gift is no protection against ending up 
in court, the second is that entering into a lawsuit against an 
opponent who does not have his own resources at risk can lead 
to a very lengthy and expensive litigation, coupled with an ag-
gressive public-relations campaign.
A third lesson is to think twice before creating the kind of “sup-
porting organization” that was established to administer Marie 
Robertson’s gift.
Such a mechanism can help sustain the interest of the donor and 
the donor’s advisers, but there are other ways to achieve this 
goal without introducing a structure that confers corporate ob-
ligations and standing to sue that ordinarily would not be avail-
able to donors of restricted gifts.
This lawsuit was settled when the Robertsons decided not to take 
the case to trial. To avoid continuing legal expense, Princeton 
agreed to a settlement amount that will be paid out over a 10-
year period and used solely to support charitable purposes.
But the key term of the settlement agreement is that the Robert-
son Foundation is being dissolved, with all of its assets being 
transferred to Princeton, which will have sole authority to de-
cide how these funds are to be invested and how they can best be 
used. This means that the bulk of Marie Robertson’s gift is now 
protected from further attempts to divert it to other uses and 
that it can continue to be used, in perpetuity, as she intended in 
making her gift, to support the graduate program of Princeton’s 
Woodrow Wilson School.
Robert K. Durkee
Vice President and Secretary
Princeton University
“Robertson vs. Princeton vs. Donor Intent” 
Letter to the Editor, The Chronicle of Philanthropy, January 29, 2009 
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Robertson v. Princeton thus stands as a reminder to do-
nors that their gifts to colleges and universities are not 
self-executing.
Freeman’s Response to Piereson
Mr. Piereson’s comments are both measured and in-structive. I would add only the following gloss.
I should have made it clear in my paper that the 
Robertsons have in fact moved on. They are fully 
engaged in building their new foundation. I, too, have 
moved on, although I found irresistible Bradley Center 
Director Bill Schambra’s invitation to refl ect on the 
case, which riveted the attention of donors and would-
be donors for almost seven years.
Princeton cannot move on quite yet. It has unfi nished 
business with its alumni, many of whom are concerned 
that what happened to the Robertsons could happen to 
them. Given the current state of its fi nances, Princeton 
must persuade the alumni to continue high levels of 
fi nancial support. The university’s message thus reduces 
to something like this: “We did nothing wrong and we 
promise not to do it again.” Will it work? In time, I’m 
sure it will. Loyalties run long and memories tend to 
fade. Will it work long-term? It’s probably more likely 
that, a generation hence, another generous family will 
have to remind Princeton of its obligations to donors.  
Mr. Piereson states, and Mr. Eisenberg suggests, 
that foundations occasionally outlive their missions. 
That’s quite true (though not as frequently true as 
grantees choose to believe). Over time, missions are 
accomplished or in other ways rendered irrelevant. But 
that was not the case here. Through most of the Clinton 
administration, all of the Bush administration and into 
the early days of the Obama administration, the State 
Department has pleaded for more language specialists, 
more regional experts, more professionals steeped 
in the culture of nations now emerging beyond Old 
Europe and the Anglosphere. It could be convincingly 
argued that the Robertson mission is more important 
today than the day the fi rst check was written. 
Terrence Scanlon 
Neal Freeman aptly summarized his assessment of the Robertson v. Princeton case in a December 11 
commentary he wrote for the American Spectator On-
line just after the settlement was announced: “Princeton 
blinked.” I think that’s about right.
Freeman noted there that after a six-year war of 
attrition, Princeton was starting to look like the “Dennis 
Kozlowski of American universities.” The school acted 
like an arrogant bully in rejecting the family’s charge 
that it was misappropriating funds intended for students 
to build careers in government service. Had the case 
gone to trial, the Robertsons were prepared to present 
evidence in court showing that Princeton misused as 
much as $200 million dollars from the Robertson 
Foundation on activities unrelated to the purposes of 
the gift. 
Freeman ended his commentary by writing, “The next 
time a nonprofi t executive is seized by larcenous im-
pulse it may be necessary only to whisper in his ear the 
magic word, ‘Princeton.’”
I am completely sympathetic to Freeman’s view of 
Princeton’s malfeasance. However, I would note 
that in reaching the settlement Princeton admitted no 
wrongdoing. Indeed, Princeton continues to denigrate 
the Robertsons—most recently in a letter-to-the-editor 
from a Princeton vice president appearing in the January 
29 issue of The Chronicle of Philanthropy. Moreover, 
the Robertson Foundation will be dissolved and the 
university will walk away with all but $100 million of 
the money. Freeman estimates that under Princeton’s 
mismanagement the foundation currently has about 
$585 million. 
Martin Wooster, who has written at length about the 
case for Capital Research Center (see CRC’s web site at 
http://www.capitalresearch.org/pubs/pdf/FW0506.pdf 
and chapter 2 of his CRC book, The Great Philanthro-
pists and the Problem of “Donor Intent”), warns that 
“universities can and will exploit every available loop-
hole to divert a gift to causes they prefer.” I can only 
advise that donors must still be very careful in making 
gifts that will continue over decades.
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Freeman’s Response to Scanlon
Mr. Scanlon’s comments are noted with apprecia-tion and with the exception that I wish my real-
time comments on the settlement, heat-of-battle stuff, 
had been more seemly. One more reason to thank the 
Bradley Center for this chance to consider the case in 
depth, and at some distance from the event.
Jack B. Siegel
From the Charity Governance Consulting LLC blog, 
online at http://www.charitygovernance.com. Repro-
duced with permission from Jack Siegel.
THE ROBERTSON FAMILY TAKES A PAGE OUT 
OF HILLARY CLINTON’S PLAYBOOK
Dateline: December 11, 2008, New York City
When we learned yesterday from CNBC that the Robertson Family lawsuit against Princeton Uni-
versity had settled, we jumped on a plane to the East 
Coast so that we could bask in the zeitgeist. Our con-
clusion after learning the terms of the settlement: The 
Robertson Family took a page out of Hillary Clinton’s 
playbook. First, spend a fortune kicking the something 
out of your opponent. Then, when you lose, ask your 
opponent to reimburse you for the cost of breaking his 
face. That is the upshot of what happened yesterday.
William Robertson and the other plaintiffs agreed to 
drop their lawsuit. In exchange:
1.  Princeton reimburses (over a 3-year periond) the Ban-
bury Fund for up to $40 million in litigation costs. The 
Banbury Fund is a tax-exempt foundation controlled by 
the Robertson Family that funded their side of the liti-
gation. The reimbursement will be funded with money 
from the Robertson Foundation, the entity that currently 
supports the Woodrow Wilson School.
2.  The Robertson Foundation will transfer $50 million 
to a foundation to be created by the plaintiffs. The new 
charity’s mission will be to prepare students for careers 
in government service. The transfer will take place over 
a 10-year period.
3.  The Robertson Foundation will be dissolved and its 
remaining assets will be administered as a restricted en-
dowment. That endowment was reported to be worth 
$900 million as of June 30, 2008. Reports indicate that 
it is currently worth between $600 and $700 million.
Princeton University apparently incurred somewhere 
around $40 million in defense costs. The university will 
be able to recover those costs from the Robertson Foun-
dation.
The attorney for the Robertsons, Ron Malone, told The  
Chronicle of Philanthropy (issue dated December 10, 
2008) that the family settled because
Princeton has a 1,000-year view of the world . . . . The 
family was facing spending the rest of their lives liti-
gating against Princeton and using up all the Banbury 
dollars to do that.
There is one problem with that logic: Princeton presum-
ably had that same world view back in 2002 when the 
family fi led the lawsuit. It was perfectly foreseeable that 
the litigation costs would be crushing. In that sense, the 
entire folly was irresponsible, particularly given some of 
the facts that have come out. In particular, as we recall 
the facts, the senior Mr. Robertson was involved with 
the Robertson Foundation when some of the changes 
that his children objected to were made.
What is truly galling about this settlement is that for 
$80 million, we don’t even get a judicial decision that 
advances the ball on such questions as donor standing. 
Which leads to today’s lessons:
A. Institutions Should Keep Children Off Boards. Large 
colleges and other philanthropic organizations should 
fi ght like hell to convince donors that once the donor is 
dead, other family members should have no input into 
how the money is administered. It’s one thing for donors 
to be on the board of a supporting organization; it is 
quite another to have subsequent generations and their 
baggage on the board of the organization. The old adage 
holds:  Children should be seen, but not heard.
B. Provide for Alternative Dispute Resolution. Both 
the donor and the institution should provide that any 
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disputes over the administration of a restricted fund, 
including assessing donor intent, should be resolved 
through a private alternative dispute resolution process. 
The agreement should provide a time limit on the pro-
cess and provide that no expenses will be reimbursed 
from the donated funds. It should also cap the expenses 
that both parties can spend on the process (with adjust-
ments for infl ation).
C. Legislatures Need to Clarify Standing. We need to 
move away from revolving questions of standing under 
the common law. Anybody can fi le a lawsuit and then 
spend years arguing over whether they have standing. 
That becomes a bargaining chip, as we assume it was in 
this case. We need clear statements from legislatures de-
fi ning when and who other than the state attorney gen-
eral can challenge a charity’s compliance with the terms 
of a restricted gift. The statutes also should provide clear 
rules about how members of the public (including fam-
ily members) can bring non-compliance to the attorney 
general’s attention and how the attorney general should 
respond. Uncertainty breeds this sort of litigation.
The other two branches of government fell way short in 
this case. The New Jersey Attorney General was miss-
ing in action. It is the AG’s responsibility to intervene to 
protect charitable assets. Yet the record is devoid of any 
action by the New Jersey Attorney General. Separately, 
the court should not have allowed this case to drag on. 
The 350 pages in opinions from just over a year ago fu-
eled the litigation and the costs. A probate court is sup-
posed to do equity, and one of its considerations should 
be to prevent charitable assets from being frittered away. 
Courts should stop indulging litigants in big-dollar cas-
es. Just because big dollars are involved doesn’t mean 
justice can only be done by devoting years and tens of 
millions of dollars to the dispute.  
D. Donors Should Check Their Egos. Donors should stop 
telling institutions that they know more about running 
institutions than the professionals who run the institu-
tions. Complex restrictions lead to waste. Times change. 
Donors, who will die, are simply unable to predict what 
life will be like 20 or 40 years after they are rotting in 
the ground. There is a reason for the rules against perpe-
tuity. The dead should not control the future.  
To this end, serious consideration should be given to 
charging donors for the waste and ineffi ciency that re-
stricted gifts create. One approach would be change 
Section 170 and the correponding gift and estate tax 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Give a charity 
an unrestricted gift and you get a 100 percent deduction 
for the gift. Give a charity a restricted gift and you only 
get a 50 percent deduction. Economics would cure the 
arrogance of some large donors very quickly. Before the 
world goes ballistic, we acknowledge that this proposal 
needs work, but at some point, we need to eliminate the 
wastefulness that results from trying to tie the hands of 
charities that don’t have the self-restraint to say “no.”
We are disgusted by William Robertson’s sanctimonious 
statement reported by The Chronicle of Philanthropy 
(issue dated December 10, 2008):
This is a message to nonprofi t organizations of all kinds 
and throughout our country that donors expect them to 
abide by the terms of designated gifts or suffer the con-
sequences. 
Ah, the grand crusade. As we read the outcome of this 
suit, Robertson achieved nothing except to waste some-
where around $80 million on lawyers and the other costs 
of litigation. The $50 million that will go to the new 
foundation will be used for purposes that strike us as 
not all that much different than they would have been 
had they remained at Princeton. We do have one bit of 
advice for Robertson and the universities that will ap-
parently be the benefi ciaries of the new charity: Don’t 
put your own children on the board. 
From an e-mail by Jack Siegel to William Schambra 
dated February 3, 2009:
I have been busy lately so haven’t been able to go through my records, but the question I think is fun-
damental to the dispute is what decisions changing the 
mission did the senior Robertson participate in while 
he was still alive. My understanding and recollection is 
that the senior Robertson saw some of these changes in 
direction coming while he was alive, acquiesced, and 
didn’t bring a suit. To me, if that is the case, it greatly 
undercuts the Robertson children’s challenge.
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As food for thought, it is unclear why the conservative 
movement (which I often sympathize with) takes the 
side of the donors’ survivors in these cases. The move-
ment is so worried about tort litigation and overzealous 
lawyers. The attorney general has standing to reprimand 
charities that don’t follow donor restrictions. Once a 
member of the public (a survivor) brings an alleged de-
parture from restrictions to the attention of the AG, why 
should the survivors have further legal rights? I thought 
you guys were against private causes of action where 
statutes don’t specifi cally provide for them. Moreover, 
if conservatives truly believe in the sanctity of private 
property, why don’t they recognize that the property is 
no longer owned by donors or the survivors following 
a gift? It is owned by the charity subject to the purpose 
restrictions.
The fundamental problem in this entire area is the belief 
of donors that they can predict the future. If conservatives 
truly believe that the free fl ow of capital is a good thing, 
they should not be sanctioning policies that impede that 
fl ow. Conservatives don’t like it when the government 
restricts the fl ow of capital. Why do they like it when 
dead people restrict the fl ow?
Donor restrictions that go on for decades are fundamen-
tally at odds with the effi cient fl ow of capital because 
they allow the dead to dictate the future. When I speak to 
groups on this topic, I point out that when looking back, 
I recognize how different the world is today than when 
I was in high school in the early ’70s. No computers, no 
Internet, four television stations, limited international 
travel, no CDs or DVDs, now dated medical procedures, 
no oil crisis, no developed India or China, strong labor 
unions, etc. Why do 80-year olds believe they can pre-
dict the world’s needs even 10 years after they are gone, 
let alone 40 or 50 given the changes that have occurred 
in the world while they were alive? Why should we in-
dulge their belief that they can predict the future with tax 
subsidies? I have to wonder: If the majority of colleges 
and universities were perceived as conservative, would 
the conservative movement be taking the side that it ap-
parently takes in these disputes, particularly if the sur-
viving children supported liberal causes? I suspect if he 
were alive, John Olin would agree with me.
Freeman’s Response to Siegel
I have been trying to convey a sense of what the Robertsons were up against in their contest with 
Princeton. Mr. Siegel saves me further trouble. He 
refl ects pitch-perfectly the attitude of many institutions 
toward their donors, which is: “Give us the check and 
then sit down and shut up.” When the Robertson family 
rose to make the point, “Excuse me, sir, but we had an 
agreement—” they were pronounced contumacious. I 
don’t know if Mr. Siegel is serious when he suggests 
that donors should be “charged for the waste and 
ineffi ciency that restricted grants create,” but he is saying 
aloud what many grantees murmur among themselves. 
Put aside the prudential question of whether nonprofi t 
bureaucracies should be calling attention to “waste and 
ineffi ciency”—thanks to the Robertsons, happy days 
for Mr. Siegel are not yet here again.
Tim Walter
I met in conversation last year with a group of about thirty foundation leaders in a wide-ranging dialogue 
on topics including perpetuity, donor-intent and manda-
tory payout. At a certain point, the topic of fundraising 
requests by university endowments came up and gener-
ated a surprising amount of energy and opinion—much 
of it suspicious and negative. Suffi ce to say, it seems that 
there is a gap of trust to be bridged between university 
leaders and experienced donors with regard to gifts to 
endowments. Clarity of expectations and clear commu-
nication of results would certainly help.
Freeman’s Response to Walter
Amen, brother.
Martin Morse Wooster
Neal Freeman’s insider’s account substantially adds to our understanding of the motives and tactics the 
Robertson family used in their lawsuit. But as someone 
who followed the case more closely, perhaps, than any 
outside observer, I offer two comments on the strengths 
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and weaknesses of the Robertsons’ case.
First, the Robertsons’ strongest weapon was their 
forensic accounting of how Princeton University misused 
Robertson Foundation money. They persuasively showed 
that Princeton was manipulating overhead charges and 
joint professorships to divert a substantial amount of 
Robertson Foundation money away from the Woodrow 
Wilson School and towards projects that Princeton 
preferred. The report shows that universities can and 
will use overhead charges to violate donor intent.
The weakest part of the Robertsons’ case was the no-
tion that Princeton was somehow at fault when students 
entered the Woodrow Wilson School, received their 
master’s degrees in public policy, and then decided to 
pursue other careers. When, as happened at least once, 
a student entered the Woodrow Wilson School, received 
a master’s degree, and then decided to become a profes-
sional oboist, the career change is not Princeton’s fault.
One also wonders what sort of powers Princeton’s Offi ce 
of Stewardship will have. The Robertsons showed 
some smaller violations of donor intent by Princeton, 
most notably with a Danforth Foundation grant for 
“religious work” that Princeton diverted into general 
operating support. Will the Offi ce of Stewardship be 
an accountability offi ce that will have the power to fi x 
donor intent violations?  Or (as is more likely the case) 
will they be development offi cers with new titles but not 
new responsibilities?
Princeton’s triumph over the Robertson family reminds 
donors that they should be very careful in their gifts 
to higher education. Princeton’s misuse of Robertson 
Foundation money substantially weakens the bonds of 
trust that universities have with their donors, and should 
remind donors to exercise caution before entering into 
any agreements with universities.
Freeman’s Response to Wooster
Mr. Wooster’s comments are, as always, heuristic. His argument that Princeton is beyond criticism 
when Wilson students “decide to pursue other careers” 
misses the point, however, and I hope not intentionally 
so. Remember, Wilson is a professional school, designed 
to prepare young adults for a specifi c career. We’re not 
talking about Camp Be-All-You-Can-Be for wayward 
youth. 
To shift the frame of reference somewhat, suppose that 
students at Harvard Medical School began to show 
a marked trend toward careers in architecture, rather 
than medicine. Suppose, also, that the trend continued 
for many years and then accelerated, all with the clear 
if mostly tacit encouragement of the dean and his 
administration? Would donors to the medical school not 
have cause for alarm? Would the governing board not 
have the right, indeed the responsibility, to address the 
situation? Would it be the right course for any responsible 
party to shrug his shoulders and say, “Hey, it’s a free 
country and we need architects and oboists every bit 
as much as we need doctors.” No, the Wilson School 
produced so many investment bankers not because of 
some spontaneous counseling riot on Career Day, but 
because the school made it known systematically that 
would-be bankers would be warmly welcomed, that they 
would be appropriately trained and that they would be 
introduced to Wall Street recruiters in the most favorable 
settings. A perfectly valid mission, most people would 
agree. It was just not the Robertsons’ mission.
Mr. Wooster’s characterization of the settlement as a 
“triumph” for Princeton leaves the fl abber a mite gasted. 
I have had my say elsewhere on who won and who lost 
the case, but, even so, Mr. Wooster reminds us of what 
the ancient warrior said to those congratulating him on 
his victory over the Roman legions: “One more such 
victory and Pyrrhus is undone.” 
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